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Full nuclear disarmament and the effective non-proliferation of atomic 
weapons are two of the most challenging aspirations of humankind. To  tackle 
these issues, most analysts focus on the experiences of nuclear-weapon-
owning states. A different perspective is taken here, however, by drawing 
lessons regarding global non-proliferation and disarmament from one of 
the most successful cases of compliance worldwide: namely, Latin America.
 • Today, Latin America is one of the world’s most compliant regions in nuclear 
non-proliferation and a key advocate of atomic disarmament. It was the first 
densely populated region in the world to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone; 
it hosts the only bilateral safeguard agency worldwide; and, it houses large res-
ervoirs of uranium and other fissionable materials. 
 • Historically, nonetheless, Latin America showed variation in state behaviour 
vis-à-vis nuclear affairs, with some countries being proactive within the non-
proliferation regime and others distancing themselves from it. It is, therefore, a 
relevant case to consider when looking for lessons on global non-proliferation 
and disarmament.
 • Three lessons can be drawn from its experience: a broad understanding of con-
fidence-building measures is vital to facilitate lasting trust among countries; 
institutional creativity is imperative in the nuclear non-proliferation and disar-
mament realms; and, good communication is crucial to compliance. 
Policy Implications
Latin America’s experiences with non-proliferation and disarmament efforts 
can be applied to Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. Effective 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation depends on creating background 
conditions for cooperation, trust, and institutions. These elements must lead to a 
cognitive change in how people understand the nature of nuclear weapons.
P
ho
to
: 
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Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation in Latin America
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) enshrined a “grand 
bargain” in which nuclear have-nots forwent nuclear arms in exchange for unre-
stricted cooperation over peaceful atomic technology and on the promise of full 
nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon states. As the NPT’s 50th anniversary ap-
proaches in 2020, its agreed promises are yet to be met however. Efforts on nuclear 
disarmament are at a standstill, and non-proliferation has failed in critical regions 
such as south Asia (India and Pakistan), the Middle East (Israel and, possibly, 
Iran), and Europe (where countries rely on the North Atlantic Treaty organiza-
tion’s nuclear umbrella). 
Most analysists turn to the experiences of nuclear-weapon-owning states when 
looking at how to fulfil the NPT’s promises. This contribution instead draws lessons 
from one of the most successful cases of compliance worldwide: Latin America. 
because of its achievements in non-proliferation, the spotlight would progressively 
turn away from Latin America. Its experience, nonetheless, can offer invaluable 
contributions to other regions, as well as to global efforts with regard to nuclear 
security. In this contribution, I draw three specific lessons from Latin America for 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and apply them to specific scenarios 
worldwide.
Latin America was the first densely inhabited region in the world to  become 
 legally free of nuclear weapons. It also houses large reservoirs of fissionable  materials, 
with known uranium deposits in Argentina, brazil, colombia, Mexico, and Peru, 
and possible ones in Guyana and Paraguay too. Policymakers did not overlook these 
natural capabilities. seeking to achieve energy security, three Latin American coun-
tries succeeded in developing the full scope of nuclear technology for peaceful pur-
poses: Argentina, brazil, and Mexico. All three are active participants in the global 
nuclear market, while brazil is the only non-nuclear-weapon state on the verge of 
launching a nuclear-powered submarine (by 2029). 
In the non-proliferation realm, Latin American countries historically  pursued 
different policies. While countries like costa Rica and Mexico are traditional 
 upbeat promoters of non-proliferation institutions, and particularly the NPT, 
brazil,  Argentina, and chile have meanwhile oscillated between detachment from 
non-proliferation institutions and decisive participation in them. Detachment 
came from the understanding that non-proliferation institutions, the NPT espe-
cially, were an imposition by superpowers and could block the full development of 
 peripheral states. The nuclear bargain was merely a lie to justify an unequal treaty. 
Participation in the NPT and other institutions came only in the 1990s; even then, 
it was conditioned on progress in nuclear disarmament. 
Broad Confidence-Building Measures
The first lesson is that cross-thematic cooperation underpins a broader understand-
ing of confidence-building measures. The latter cover the bilateral or  multilateral 
actions that enhance mutual trust, as a means to reduce the fear of attack and  thereby 
halt an arms race. cross-thematic cooperation means that actions intended to  enable 
talks on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should not be restricted to 
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the arms-control realm. They should, instead, involve cooperation efforts in other 
 thematic areas such as economy, trade, and defence too. This inverts the traditional 
understanding of confidence-building, which advocates that having many things 
on the table at the same time leads to dissent – and blocks, therefore, possible 
 cooperation. 
Having a broad set of economic-, societal-, and security-related issues on the 
table expands, in fact, the scope of confidence-building measures. This expansion 
is a most-welcome strategy when it comes to non-proliferation and disarmament 
 because it dilutes the strategic relevance of the possession of nuclear weapons. In 
 Latin America, broad confidence-building measures enabled negotiators to realise 
that all countries would be better off if money funnelled to an arms race was rather 
spent on social and economic development instead (caro 1995:9). In other words, 
they realised that countries would thrive faster and more sustainably through 
 cooperation rather than through confrontation. confidence-building measures 
transcended the nuclear realm and shifted focus to broader targets so as to  ensure 
“peace, democracy and development” (souza e silva with caro 1995: 9). Peace, 
therefore, was not meant to be achieved alone.
In the southern cone, genuine cooperation in the nuclear realm was possible 
in the late 1980s, after brazil and Argentina managed to resolve a regional crisis 
regarding the construction of Itaipu Hydropower Plant and the use of shared  river 
sources. Also crucial was the brazilian logistic backing to Argentina during the 
Malvinas War (1982), which was a sign of support against an external opponent. 
Later confidence-building measures aimed at consolidating good relations between 
the two countries on a lasting basis. They led to political and economic integration 
within the framework of the southern common Market (Mercosur), and the intensi-
fication of defence and diplomatic cooperation. In the nuclear realm, these meas-
ures were validated by the creation of the brazilian–Argentine Agency of Account-
ing and control of Nuclear Materials (AbAcc).
Europe and the Middle East
A broader concept of confidence-building measures that covers cross-thematic 
cooperation could also be an enabling condition for non-proliferation and disar-
mament elsewhere in the world. The first example is Western Europe. Isaac caro 
(1995) highlights that, unlike in Latin America, European confidence-building 
measures in nuclear and arms-control negotiations were systematically dissociated 
from actions in other areas, such as trade, environment, and defence cooperation. 
The aim behind this dissociation was to avoid distraction and to give the needed 
emphasis to the military and security sectors, as historically connected with the 
transatlantic alliance.
In Western Europe, there are two main approaches to non-proliferation and dis-
armament. on the one hand, NATo members accept the role of deterrence in their 
security policies and favour an indeterminate long-term Global Zero  solution. They 
traditionally isolate arms control from other kinds of cooperation  efforts,  adhering 
to a restricted understanding of confidence-building measures. on the other hand, 
nuclear-free countries like Austria favour a more urgent solution to nuclear dis-
armament efforts. Austria was one of the main supporters of the  Humanitarian 
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Initiative leading to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), 
and the country argues that nuclear disarmament should not be separated from 
 parallel efforts because atomic weapons have an insurmountable environmental 
and  humanitarian impact. 
A broader understanding of confidence-building measures should incentivise 
closer cooperation between these two European approaches to non-proliferation 
and disarmament, leading to joint action. With already well-developed integration 
in multiple spheres, European countries are in a position to pursue talks leading to 
a common position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues.  Instead 
of furthering divisions between the two approaches, European states should focus 
instead on using existing institutions as a means to achieve a compromise that 
 favours short- and medium-term disarmament. This could be done, for  example, 
by including nuclear disarmament in negotiations on environmental protection 
and defence cooperation in forums such as those found in the European union. A 
 further step would be extending cross-thematic cooperation with Russia, perceived 
as the most likely foe by European states. 
A broader understanding of confidence-building measures would also serve 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the Middle East. A lack of 
integration among Middle Eastern countries and interstate rivalries are critical to 
the partial failure of non-proliferation efforts in the region. strengthening coopera-
tion in political and economic relations is, therefore, a crucial first step to enabling 
negotiations on nuclear affairs. In the Middle East, this means creating conditions 
for the normalisation of the relations between Arab states, Israel, and Iran. 
The E3+3 negotiations leading to the 2015 Joint comprehensive Plan of Action 
foresaw the lifting of sanctions on Iran as a necessary step towards that country’s 
compliance. Likewise, the recent idea of creating a trading platform with Iran to 
ensure its continued compliance after the united states pulled out of the treaty also 
follows the guidelines for the first lesson – as it binds non-proliferation together 
with the promotion of trade and cash flows. This alone is, however, not enough, as 
effective non-proliferation also entails the inclusion of neighbouring states. These 
states – particularly Arab countries – should use the opportunity at hand to inten-
sify the discussions on a “Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone” and pursue in 
the meantime further integration in other realms – particularly those regarding 
conditions for development. 
Institutional Creativity
The second lesson to be drawn from Latin America is that effective nuclear disarma-
ment and non-proliferation entails institutional creativity. Institutions denote here 
not only physical organisations but also treaties, agreements, and conceptual devel-
opments. All these spheres are relevant. Institutional creativity demands smart use 
of three arenas: bilateral, regional, and multilateral ones. In the juridical domain, 
the creative use of all three arenas enables countries to tailor treaties that cover the 
specific needs of a regional context within a multidimensional approach. 
over time, Latin American countries developed multiple channels to define 
common lines of action in foreign policy. These developments were bound by the 
concept of “complimentary, but not conflicting” approaches – meaning that efforts 
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in multiple overlapping institutions could drive, instead of be a barrier to, further 
commitments in a specific issue area. Examples of institutional developments 
 include: the Treaty of Tlatelolco (regional), which established a nuclear-weapon-
free zone (NWFZ) in Latin America; the Treaty of Guadalajara (bilateral), which 
created the AbAcc; and, international partnerships with extra-regional partners, 
such as the New Agenda coalition and the “Zone of Peace and cooperation in the 
south  Atlantic” (ZoPAcAs) – which made the south Atlantic ocean free of nuclear 
 weapons. The latter was created as an alternative proposal to military alliances, 
 following the NATo model. 
Middle East, East Asia, and the Indian Ocean
Institutional creativity has recently been attempted in regions such as the Middle 
East, as shown by the Iran talks, and in East Asia, with the recent summit negotia-
tions between President Donald Trump and supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. These 
attempts are, however, being pushed by external actors with specific interests in the 
respective regions. The Latin American example shows that even though third-party 
countries can drive cooperation, neighbouring ones themselves should  tailor effec-
tive institutions in regard to nuclear non-proliferation. Initiatives like the Egypt-led 
proposal to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East are welcome, but should first focus 
on finding consensus among regional countries. 
Institutions should be designed to fit the specific necessities of the world region 
in question. This is particularly important regarding the degree of institutionalisa-
tion of NWFZs. by the time of the signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, there was 
in Latin America no institutional forum that included all members without the par-
ticipation of the us, a nuclear-weapon state. The creation of the Agency for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the caribbean (oPANAL) 
was necessary, therefore, to ensure compliance with the treaty. Today, oPANAL 
has become a forum where Latin American states meet and define joint perspectives 
on nuclear issues. It is also an independent organisation, listed among those con-
sulted for reports requested by the united Nations General Assembly. More recent 
NWFZs, such as in the south Pacific and southeast Asia, have been managed and 
verified by pre-existing international institutions (Macedo soares 2017). others, 
like in Africa, are still in the first steps of creating their own institutions. 
In the case of the Middle East, an oPANAL-like model would create an inclu-
sive forum for all states of the region. It should, nonetheless, go further, so as to en-
sure both an own system of inspection and to develop means to promote disarma-
ment – since a solution that does not include Israel would probably not last long. An 
organisation that effectively supports non-proliferation in that region would have, 
therefore, to mix elements of oPANAL with duties like those seen in AbAcc, which 
promotes joint inspections conducted by neighbouring countries. 
AbAcc could also inspire a preliminary arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. 
Although scholars like former brazilian minister for science and technology José 
Goldemberg are not sanguine about an AbAcc-like model that includes nuclear-
weapon states (Goldemberg 2015), safeguard mechanisms would help increase 
confidence among countries. cooperation in ensuring the safety of nuclear power 
plants could build trust – with it capable of spilling over to future nuclear-weapon-
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related measures. unlike in the case of Latin America, a bilateral safeguard mecha-
nism on the Korean Peninsula should be implemented as an initial step towards 
ensuring the long-term denuclearisation of military arsenals there and be dealt with 
alongside talks with china and the us. 
Another area of concern in nuclear affairs is the Indian ocean. For that region, 
a forum like ZoPAcAs could help reduce tensions between countries. The idea of 
an Indian ocean “zone of peace” is not new. It was first proposed in 1970 by sri 
Lanka; it was signed onto by India and Pakistan, and it was formalised by Resolu-
tion 2832 of the uN General Assembly from 1971 onwards. This resolution focused, 
nonetheless, on limiting ambitions of “great powers” in the Indian ocean and did 
not address further institutionalisation in the region (Afzal 2017). It was, therefore, 
a lost opportunity to create a forum able to catalyse cooperation and define tailored 
solutions with low financial costs. 
Global disarmament
on the global level, not one single nuclear weapon has been disarmed by a multi-
lateral treaty until today. Progress on disarmament has been rather either through 
informal meetings of P5 countries (those allowed to have nuclear weapons by the 
NPT: namely, china, France, Russia, the united Kingdom, and the us) or, most 
 commonly, through bilateral treaties between the us and Russia. under this  current 
constellation, global nuclear disarmament is nearly impossible since there is no 
 cohesion between the respective disarmament policies of nuclear-weapon states 
and given that they show little – if any – interest in changing the international 
status quo. 
As with non-proliferation, effective nuclear disarmament entails institutional 
elements to (1) push and to (2) verify measures. such elements could, at first, be 
developed under a flexible structure such as an extended version of current P5 talks, 
but should evolve into a more institutionalised arrangement. such a forum would 
need to include, to some extent, de facto nuclear-weapon states such as  India, 
 Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan, as well as representatives from countries that 
refrain from acquiring such weapons. In that later phase, verification is crucial – 
either through an extension of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s functions 
or through the creation of a specific organisation with full access to all nuclear pro-
grammes of nuclear-weapon states. 
Non-nuclear-weapon states are also key drivers of a world free of atomic arse-
nals. Particularly relevant are the 115 members of NWFZs. Presently, these states 
do not act in a coordinated way. Preliminary efforts in that direction were taken in 
2009, when a Latin American initiative led to the first NWFZ meeting in Mongo-
lia. second and third meetings took place informally in 2010 and 2015. That infor-
mal approach is, however, not enough to ensure in-depth cooperation. For that, 
as pointed out by Ambassador Luiz Felipe Macedo de soares, the 115 NWFZ states 
should create a “permanent body” to coordinate their positions (soares 2017). A 
unified voice emanating from these states is crucial for leveraging effective disarma-
ment, just as coordination between neighbouring countries is vital for creating such 
zones in the first place. 
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Good Communication 
The third lesson is that non-proliferation and disarmament only work when coun-
tries communicate well with one another. Good communication means that coun-
tries: (1) should know what exactly they are talking about and (2) should have 
proper ways of communicating with each other. The first aspect of communication 
entails establishing clear and well-defined concepts, as to avoid potential misunder-
standings. The second aspect, meanwhile, covers developing functioning channels 
of communication between states and civil society. on the one hand, such channels 
are a prerequisite to ensure transparency between states – transparency leads to 
trust. on the other, the lack of effective communication between states increases 
the tensions generated by mistrust. 
In Latin America, conditions for good communication were created by the 
1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco – which addressed in its Article 5 the definition of nuclear 
weapons. The treaty is also clear about what constitute peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. This treaty created, therefore, the necessary foundations for future coopera-
tion between states in the region, since they could share standardised conceptual 
reference points. Establishing channels of communication is a follow-up process 
that needs more time, and more context-specific negotiations. In that regard, the 
best example comes from the dyad brazil–Argentina. 
bilateral relations between brazil and Argentina were historically characterised 
by rivalry and mistrust, leading to an intermittent arms race in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. both countries lacked accurate information about 
each other’s real military capabilities. both thought the other more readily prepared 
for war than it really was; both thought they would lose a war against the other. 
conditions for overcoming this long-standing rivalry eventually came about in the 
1980s through cross-thematic cooperation and through brazil’s  informal support 
for Argentina during the Malvinas War. Together with the creation of Mercosur 
and the intensification of military cooperation, brazil and Argentina also created 
AbAcc – an agency through which inspectors had unrestricted access to all nuclear 
facilities in both countries. This agency owes part of its success to pre-existing con-
sensus concerning concepts and definitions, as enshrined in the Treaty of  Tlatelolco. 
Global disarmament
Low levels of communication go to the core of many negotiations on non-prolifera-
tion and disarmament. on the regional level, a study by Müller et al. (2015) shows 
that many NWFZ treaties clearly define what their objectives are. These definitions 
are, furthermore, compatible with one another and with the basic ones of the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco too. on the global level, however, NPT negotiators consciously avoided 
clear definitions in crafting foundational concepts such as “peaceful uses” and “dis-
armament.” The aim was to provide manageable levels of ambiguity so as to allow 
superpowers to keep their nuclear arsenals. In the grand bargain, non-proliferation 
was more relevant than disarmament.
Making the disarmament pillar stronger is, therefore, a crucial step to achiev-
ing a Global Zero. For that, the international community should create multilateral 
institutions that cover three concepts for which there are no consensual definitions 
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at present. The first concerns what “disarmament” is. Does it cover only a  reduction 
of warheads, or does it also include limitations to the overall destruction capabili-
ties of a nuclear arsenal? The second conceptual definition needed is how far “mod-
ernisation” overlaps and clashes with disarmament efforts. Does modernisation 
mean building up an arsenal, since it increases the destruction capabilities of exist-
ing explosives? The third conceptual need covers the designation of indicators to 
“verify” disarmament, and which institution(s) should be responsible for that. How 
can we verify what exactly was disarmed?
South Asia
The second aspect of good communication is creating solid channels of it. This is 
particularly important for regional environments such as south Asia, where the 
deep-rooted rivalry between India and Pakistan echoes that between brazil and 
 Argentina during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A crucial difference, 
nonetheless, is the number of wars in the region since the 1950s, and unresolved 
territorial disputes – particularly in Kashmir. Attempts at rapprochement between 
both countries are also frequently interrupted by terrorist attacks or by specific 
 incidents. The impact of such incidents is, nonetheless, amplified by the lack of 
solid channels of communication between the two countries and by uncertainty 
about each other’s military doctrine. This confusion is illustrated by the ambiguity 
surrounding India’s “no first use” policy (Jaspal 2019). 
A preliminary step towards future disarmament could come from  cooperation on 
energy-related issues. one possibility would be establishing talks aimed at  creating a 
“bilateral mechanism” to improve nuclear security, since both countries “do a poor 
job of safeguarding nuclear materials” (sarkar 2016). This mechanism could be a 
less institutionalised version of the brazilian–Argentine one – aimed first and fore-
most at establishing a channel of communication that could potentially become a 
proper safeguard agency. Taking a first step is, nonetheless, important. 
Cognitive Changes are Possible
If applied effectively, the three lessons discussed above should contribute to prepar-
ing the ground for a world without nuclear weapons – a Global Zero. such a world 
would be structurally different from our current one and is one possible only in the 
long run, after states change their understanding of the nature of nuclear weapons. 
Genuine commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation requires cognitive and 
ideational changes in both policymaker and societal mindsets. In other words, a 
Global Zero for atomic weapons predicates a world in which people believe that 
nuclear weapons harm instead of ensure their overall safety. 
cognitive change globally regarding nuclear weapons would only be  possible 
within an international system that upholds institutional structures  facilitating trust 
and transparency in nuclear politics, as the three lessons have shown. Although it 
may sound idealistic, this cognitive change has already happened in  several parts 
of the world – starting in Latin America, and culminating in the humanitarian 
movement to ban nuclear weapons. It is usually generational change that brings 
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about the consolidation of the trust measures and institutions needed to ensure real 
change in people’s mindsets. 
In Latin America, public opinion was traditionally largely against the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons – particularly so in Mexico and central America at large. In the 
southern cone, conversely, a change in perceptions came about gradually, as there 
was divergence of opinion between groups in brazil and Argentina defending the 
unrestricted pursuit of nuclear energy – including peaceful nuclear explosives – 
and those defending doing away with all nuclear technology. The first group acquired 
some prominence during Juan Peron’s administrations in Argentina (1946–1955, 
1973–1974), and during the late phase of the military dictatorship in brazil – espe-
cially during Arthur da costa e silva’s (1967–1969) and João Figueiredo’s (1979–
1985) terms in office. They were, however, eclipsed by the second group in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, when a consensus view against all kinds of nuclear explosive 
was arrived at. 
Today, nuclear weapons are a “problem of privilege and power” rather than of 
security (umaña 2019: 1). This perception is framed and complemented by the un-
derstanding that the continued existence of atomic weapons poses a humanitarian 
and environmental threat to humankind as a whole. Failure in nuclear disarma-
ment weakens not only existing non-proliferation, but also the prohibition of other, 
less destructive, weapons of mass destruction – ones biological and chemical. 
In 2017, a group of 122 states adopted the earlier-mentioned TPNW. All Latin 
American countries partook in the preparatory conference chaired by costa Rica. 
The draft of the treaty is a relevant development for the push for global disarma-
ment, even if it has been boycotted by all states with nuclear weapons and most 
NATo allies. The main objective of this treaty is to establish a legal norm against 
the possession of atomic weapons, complementing existing institutions that forbid 
their acquisition by other countries. It is a stigmatisation tool which enshrines in 
law a cognitive change that is being slowly developed inside non-nuclear-weapon 
states and civil society.
This cognitive change must follow two complementary steps. The first, and most 
difficult, one is making current nuclear-weapon states separate out cognitively the 
possession of such weapons from their immediate security concerns. This means 
demystifying deterrence, while highlighting the negative aspects of atomic weap-
ons. This change should come both from civil society and from pressure applied by 
non-nuclear-weapon states. The second step is establishing a cognitive structure 
that not only rejects reliance on nuclear weapons but that also constraints states 
that possess or pursue those arms. This implies switching the position of prestige 
from the possession to the non-possession of nuclear weapons – similarly to what 
was verified with other weapons of mass destruction, whose owners are currently 
marginalised and condemned by the international community. 
Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World
The only truly effective way to avoid a nuclear conflict is by completely eliminating 
such weapons. A Global Zero has, therefore, been a key goal of the international 
community, particularly since the end of the cold War – even if efforts in that direc-
tion remain lacklustre at present. In recent years, nuclear disarmament and non-
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proliferation have re-emerged as issues of concern. on the one hand, new hotspots 
have emerged in critical areas such as south and East Asia, the Middle East, and 
Europe; on the other, creative efforts to drive forward global nuclear disarmament 
and achieve true non-proliferation worldwide have arisen. This is good news.
This contribution drew three lessons from Latin America for non-proliferation 
and disarmament efforts worldwide. These lessons are not exhaustive, and are con-
text-specific. They offer, nonetheless, broad knowledge that could (and should) be 
applied to other world regions and to global efforts. They show that non-prolifer-
ation and disarmament are complementary efforts, even if the second is currently 
less emphasised. They highlight that effective nuclear disarmament and non-prolif-
eration depend on creating the right background conditions for cooperation. 
countries should focus on building broad trust in multiple issue areas (first les-
son), instead of isolating arms control from other key development themes. They 
should also design institutions that match the specific demands of their respective 
regions or that foster the cohesion of non-nuclear-weapon states as a group (second 
lesson). behind all those initiatives, there should be clear conceptualisations and 
the aim to establish channels of dialogue between states – two aspects of good com-
munication (third lesson). In the long run, such efforts should lead to the creation 
of proper conditions for spurring cognitive changes that not only demystify but also 
stigmatise the possession and development of nuclear weapons by any state. only 
in such a world will a Global Zero be viable. 
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